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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Randolph Mark Snowball, a.k.a. Mark C. Snowball, appeals from the summary
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Snowball filed his petition for postconviction relief one day after the statute of limitation had run.

Mr. Snowball alleged

that the time for filing his petition should be tolled because he brought a claim of actual
innocence.

The district court dismissed the petition because no Idaho court had yet

adopted such a ground for tolling. He requests that this Court adopt such a ground and
hold that Mr. Snowball's allegations survive summary dismissal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2008, Mr. Snowball was found guilty of intimidating a witness.

(R., pp.4-5.)

He appealed, and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished
opinion. (R., p.5.) The remittitur was issued on February 14, 2010. (R., p.5.)
On February 15, 2011, Mr. Snowball filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., p.4.)

His first claim was actual innocence; his second claim was a Crawford 1

violation; and his third claim was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mr. Snowball

attached two affidavits to his petition, one from Andrew Wolf, and one from Whitnee
Snowball. 2
According to Mr. Wolf, on September 23, 2007, he was housed in the Ada
County Jail with Mr. Snowball and another inmate. (R., p.9.) Mr. Snowball told them

1
2

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Ms. Snowball and Ms. Ward are the same person.

1

that his girlfriend, Whitnee Ward, had filed false charges of domestic battery against him
after they had a verbal disagreement. (R., p.9.) Mr. Snowball stated that he wanted
Ms. Ward to come forward and tell the truth, but Ms. Ward was hesitant to admit that
she had lied to the police.

(R., p.'10.)

Mr. Wolf stated that he had witnessed

Mr. Snowball receive several letters from Ms. Ward which contained exculpatory
information and that Ms. Ward visited Mr. Snowball several times despite the presence
of a no-contact order.

(R. p.10.) According to Mr. Wolf, Mr. Snowball told him that

Ms. Ward had asked Mr. Snowball to find out how she could avoid coming to court
because she did not want to admit that she lied to the police. (R., p.10.) Ms. Ward told
Mr. Snowball that she felt coerced by the prosecutor and stopped returning her calls.
(R., p.10.) Mr. Snowball sought Mr. Wolf and the other inmate's assistance in writing a

letter that responded to Ms. Ward's questions, but still encouraged her to tell the truth.
(R., p.10.)

Mr. Wolf believed that Mr. Snowball's intent in sending the letter was to

answer Ms. \/'-Jard's questions and to tell the truth. (R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf did not believe
that Mr. Snowball had attempted to intimidate Ms. Ward. (R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf had never
been interviewed by anyone regarding Mr. Snowball's letter. (R., p.11.)
In Ms. Snowball's affidavit, she confirmed that she filed a false report of domestic
battery and at the time was under the influence of alcohol and medication. (R., p.12.)
She admitted that, although there was a no-contact order with her and Mr. Snowball,
she visited Mr. Snowball several times at the jail by using her sister's identification card.
(R., p.13.) She stated that she had read the letter that lead to Mr. Snowball's charges

for intimidating a witness and that everything in the letter was information that she
requested from Mr. Snowball during her visits at the jail. (R., p.13.) She believed that

2

Mr. Snowball was innocent of the crime and was only attempting to answer her
questions, not influence her testimony. (R., p.13.)
Mr. Snowball subsequently filed his own affidavit in which he too asserted that he
only sent the letter because Ms. Snowball specifically inquired about the information
and "did not attempt to intimidate, impede, deter, threaten, harass, obstruct, or prevent
Whitnee from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully in the underlying domestic battery
case." (R., p.32.)
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, asserting that the petition was
untimely. (R., p.36.) Mr. Snowball responded, asserting that the time period for filing
his petition should be tolled because he asserted a claim of actual innocence.
(R., pp.41, 43.)

The district court summarily dismissed the petition. Regarding the claim of actual
innocence, the court doubted that Mr. Snowball's new evidence would demonstrate his
innocence. (R., p.51.) However, the court specifically did not dismiss on this ground;
rather, the court dismissed the petition because Idaho has yet to adopt actual innocence
as a ground for tolling. (R., p.51.) The district court stated:
In this case Mr. Snowball argues the new affidavits he has submitted with
his petition coupled with his argument regarding his constitutional right to
confront witnesses under Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004),
make this showing such that the Idaho statutory deadline for submitting
his UPCPA petition should be tolled. The court has reviewed the affidavits
of Mark Snowball and Whitnee Snowball. The court is not convinced that
any juror acting reasonably and considering the testimony in these new
affidavits could not still find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, this Court does not reject his actual innocence argument on
that basis. Because actual innocence has not been established as a tolling
exception by Idaho courts the trial court will not create it here.

3

(R., p.51.)

The court then issued a final judgment dismissing the petition.

(R., p.54.)

Mr. Snowball appealed. (R., p.65.) He requests that this Court adopt actual innocence
as a ground for tolling the statute of limitation for a petition for post-conviction relief.

4

ISSUE
Should this Court adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling the statute of limitation
for filing a petition for post-conviction relief?

5

ARGUMENT
This Court Should Ado t Actual Innocence As A Ground For Tolling The Statute Of
Limitation For Filing A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A.

Introduction
The sole ground for dismissing the petition, as it relates to actual innocence, was

that Idaho had yet to adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling the statute of
limitation. (R. p.51.) Mr. Snowball requests that this Court adopt actual innocence as a
ground for tolling and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

8.

This Court Should Adopt Actual Innocence As A Ground For Tolling The Statute
Of Limitation For Filing A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249-51 (2009).
However, "[t]he 'application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of
the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1)."' State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548, 560 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct App. 2002)).
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth
the grounds upon which the application is based." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561(citing I.C. §
19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Id.
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary
hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

6

Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho

76, 80 (2002)). This standard applies equally to questions regarding the accrual of
actions and the passage of the statute of limitations. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,
249-51 (2009)(citing Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthome, 147 Idaho 401, 405 (2009)).
Mr. Snowball does not dispute that his petition was untimely by one day.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.1-11.)

However, he asserts that his claim of actual innocence should

survive by virtue of equitable tolling. In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007), the
Idaho Supreme Court held that rigid application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts
from considering "claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the time
limit, yet raise important due process issues." Id. at 904.
In Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in instances of a Brady
violation, "there may be a tolling of the one year statute of limitations until discovery of
the Brady violation." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904. The Court of Appeals has applied
equitable tolling in two other circumstances: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated
in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access
to Idaho legal materials; (2) and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication
renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing
challenges to his conviction." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960 (Ct.App.2003). The
Idaho Supreme Court subsequently adopted these two grounds for tolling. Rhoades v.
State, 148 Idaho 247, 251 (2009).

In Rhoades, the petitioner asserted a claim of actual innocence in a successive petition
for post-conviction relief. Id. at 252-53. The Court determined, "[w]e need not and do
not decide today whether due process requires a free-standing actual innocence

7

exception to the application of I.C. § 19-4902." Id. at 253. This was because the Court
ultimately concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the test for actual innocence. The
Court stated that the standard is, "as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Schlup v. Delo, 'the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence."' Id. (citing
Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

The Rhoades Court found that the

information supplied by the petition did not cast doubt over the petitioner's guilt, and
thus, "conclude[d] that Rhoades had failed to establish a prima facie case of actual
innocence." Id.
Schlup actually involved not a free-standing actual innocence exception, but

rather, '·was addressing a showing required for a federal habeas petitioner to avoid a
procedural bar to the consideration of his constitutional claims." Fields v. State, 151
Idaho 18, 22(2011 ). In Fields, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in Schlup, the United
States Supreme Court, "was not setting forth a requirement applicable to state claims
for post-conviction relief." Id. The Court thus held that Schlup was inapplicable to that
case, whether the petitioner brought a claim of innocence pursuant to I.C. § 194901 (a)(6), which requires that a petitioner demonstrate, "in light of all admissible
evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who committed the offense." Id.
Mr. Snowball assets, however, that the Schlup standard should be applied to his
case.

Unlike the petitioner in Fields supra, Mr. Snowball is not asserting a claim of

innocence based on fingerprint or DNA test results, and thus, the standard set forth in
the statute, that the petitioner prove that he is not the person who committed the
offense, is not applicable. Rather, the test should be, as adopted in Rhoades, that, "the

8

petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in light of the new evidence."
Mr. Snowball submits that he meets this test.

In the affidavits submitted in

support of the petition, Andrew Wolfs stated that he had witnessed Mr. Snowball
received several letters from Ms. Snowball which contained exculpatory information and
had witnessed Ms. Snowball visiting Mr. Snowball several times in violation of a nocontact order.

(R., p.10.)

According to Mr. Wolfe, Mr. Snowball told him that

Ms. Snowball had asked him to find out how she could avoid coming to court because
she did not want to admit that she had lied to the police. (R., p.10.) Mr. Snowball then
sought Mr. Wolf's and another inmate's assistance in writing a letter that responded to
Ms. Snowball's questions, but still encouraged her to tell the truth. (R., p.10.) Mr. Wolf
believed that Mr. Snowball's intent in sending the letter was not answer Ms. Snowball's
questions and to tell her to tell the truth, not try to intimidate her. (R., p.10.)
In Ms. Snowball's affidavit, she confirmed that she filed a false report of domestic
battery and at the time was under the influence of alcohol and other medication.
(R., p.12.) She admitted that, although there was a no-contact order between her and
Mr. Snowball, she visited Mr. Snowball several times at the jail by using her sister's
identification card.

(R., p.13.)

She stated that she had read the letter that lead to

Mr. Snowball's charges for intimidating a witness and that everything in the letter was
information that she requested from Mr. Snowball during her visits at the jail. (R., p.13.)
Thus, Ms. Snowball believed that Mr. Snowball was innocent and was not seeking to
influence her testimony. (R., p.13.)

9

Mr. Snowball's affidavit likewise asserted that he was visited by Ms. Snowball at
the jail and that the letter was merely a response to her questions and was not an
attempt to influence her testimony.

(R., p.32.)

Thus, Mr. Snowball asserts that he

established a prima facie showing of actual innocence because there was a noncriminal reason to send the letter.
Finally, Mr. Snowball asserts that this Court should toll the statute of limitation to
this claim. In Rhoades, the petitioner asserted that a claim of actual innocence provided
a basis for tolling.

The Court determined, "[w]e need not and do not decide today

whether due process requires a free-standing actual innocence exception to the
application of !.C. § 19-4902." Rhoades, ·14s Idaho at 253. This was because the court
concluded that the petitioner had not satisfied the test for innocence.

Id. This Court

should now hold that a claim of innocence tolls the statute of limitations.
Federal courts have "equitable discretion to hear the merits of procedurallydefaulted habeas claims where the failure to do so would result in a 'fundamental
miscarriage of justice,' such as the conviction of an actually innocent person." Lee v.

Lamperl, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9 th Cir. 2011) (citing Mccleskey v. Zant, 499 US. 467, 502
(1991 )).

An actual innocence exception, "serves as 'an additional safeguard against

compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' guaranteeing
that the ends of justice will be served in full." Id. (citing McC/eskey, 499 U.S. at 495.)
In the context of using actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the
consideration of constitutional claims, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "[w]e must be
vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the name of judicial
efficiency." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647 (2000). Mr. Snowball acknowledges that
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Sivak did not deal with a free-standing claim of actual innocence.

However, the

concerns are the same. Mr. Snowball asserts that an injustice occurs when a person
who can demonstrate his innocence is barred from litigating that claim simply because
he filed his petition a day late.

Strict application of the statute of limitations would

therefore work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency in Mr. Snowball's case. Thus,
he asserts that this Court should equitably toll free-standing claims of actual innocence
and permit Mr. Snowball to litigate his claim.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Snowball requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this

th day of February,

2013.

JUSTIN M'. CURTIS
Deputy S,tate Appellate Public Defender
,~
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